The present work aims to give a unity of logic via standard sequential, unpolarized games. Specifically, our vision is that there must be mathematically precise concepts of linear refinement and intuitionistic restriction of logic such that the linear refinement of classical logic (CL) coincides with (classical) linear logic (LL), and its intuitionistic restriction with the linear refinement of intuitionistic logic (IL) into intuitionistic LL (ILL). However, LL is, in contradiction to the name, cannot be the linear refinement of CL at least from the game-semantic point of view due to its concurrency and polarization. In fact, existing game semantics of LL employs concurrency, which is rather exotic to game semantics of ILL, IL or CL. Also, linear negation in LL brings polarization to logic, which is never true in (game semantics of) ILL, IL or CL. In search for the linear refinement of CL (or the classicalization of ILL), we carve out (a calculus of) linear logic negative (LL − ) from (the two-sided sequent calculus of) LL by discarding linear negation, restricting the rules Cut, ⊗R,`L, &R, ⊕L and ⊸R (for they cause concurrency) in a certain way, and adding distribution rules to recover these rules (except ⊸R) and give a translation of sequents ∆ ⊢ Γ for CL into the sequents !∆ ⊢ ?Γ for LL − . We then give a categorical semantics of LL − , for which we introduce why not monad ?, dual to the well-known of course comonad !, giving a categorical translation ∆ ⇒ Γ df . = ?(∆ ⊸ ⊸ ⊸ Γ) ∼ = !∆ ⊸ ⊸ ⊸ ?Γ of CL into LL − , which is the Kleisli extension of the standard translation ∆ ⇒ Γ df .
are all negative. Also, polarization in games corresponds to polarization in logic [4] , [24] , giving a unity of logic.
However, polarization is rather exotic to (game semantics of) CL; hence, it seems to have nothing to do with classicalization of logic or games. Also, polarization never occurs in (game semantics of) ILL, and therefore, it appears irrelevant to linear refinement of logic.
D. Sequential, Unpolarized Unity of Logic
Hence, we are concerned with LL without concurrency or polarization, which let us call linear logic negative (LL − ), and moreover, conjecture that there are mathematically precise concepts of linear refinement and intuitionistic restriction of logic such that the linear refinement of CL coincides with LL − , and its intuitionistic restriction with the linear refinement of IL into ILL, giving a sequential, unpolarized unity of logic (n.b., classicalization is the inverse of intuitionistic restriction).
Motivated in this way, we carve out the language of LL − from that of LL by discarding linear negation (for it brings polarization) and a sequent calculus LLK − for LL − from LLK by restricting the rules Cut, ⊗R,`L, &R, ⊕L and ⊸R (for they cause concurrency) in a certain way and adding distribution rules to recover these rules (except ⊸R) and translate sequents ∆ ⊢ Γ in LK − into the sequents !∆ ⊢ ?Γ in LLK − , where LK − is the calculus obtained from LK by restricting ⇒R in the same way as ⊸R in LLK − . We then give a cut-elimination procedure on LLK − by normalization-byevaluation (NBE) [25] , exploiting the game semantics below.
In terms of these calculi, linear refinement corresponds to eliminating exponentials ! and/or ? imposed (implicitly) in LK − and LJ, and intuitionistic restriction to limiting the number of formulas on the RHS of sequents to at most one. In other words, LK − (resp. LJ) is obtained from LLK − (resp. LLJ) by the translation ∆ ⊢ LK − Γ df.
= !∆ ⊢ LLJ B), and LLJ (resp. LJ) from LLK − (resp. LK − ) by intuitionistic restriction, and the two operations commute, where the subscripts indicate the underlying calculi.
E. Sequential, Unpolarized Unity of Games
We then aim to establish the game-semantic counterpart of the unity on LLK − , LK − , LLJ and LJ. Let us first explain our approach in terms of categorical logic [26] , [27] . Recall that the standard categorical semantics of ILL (without ⊥ or ⊕) is a new-Seely category (NSC) [28] , which is a symmetric monoidal closed category (SMCC) C = (C, ⊗, ⊤, ⊸) with finite products (1, &) equipped with a comonad ! and isomorphisms ⊤ ∼ → !1 and !A ⊗ !B ∼ → !(A&B) natural in A, B ∈ C such that the canonical adjunction between C and the co-Kleisli category C ! is monoidal. Its charm is its unified semantics of ILL and IL: C ! is cartesian closed, inducing the standard semantics of IL (without ⊥ or ∨) [26] , [27] . Then, to model LL − , it is a natural idea to impose on C another symmetric monoidal structure (`, ⊥), finite coproducts (0, ⊕), a monad ? and natural isomorphisms ?0 ∼ → ⊥ and ?(A ⊕ B) ∼ → ?A`?B such that the canonical adjunction between C and the Kleisli category C ? is monoidal. However, it is not possible; thus, we require that C is equipped with a lluf subcategory ♯C whose morphisms are all strict, which has the NSC-structure inherited from C (except ⊸), finite coproducts and the triple (`, ⊥, ?). Moreover, we impose a distributive law between ! and ? [29] on ♯C so that the co-Kleisli and the Kleisli constructions on ♯C are extended to each other, leading to the bi-Kleisli category ♯C ? ! df.
= (♯C ! ) ? ≃ (♯C ? ) ! . Then, if ♯C has certain natural transformations/isomorphisms, it models LLK − , and ♯C ? ! does LK − , while C and C ! do LLJ and LJ. Finally, we instantiate the categorical semantics by a gamesemantic NSC LG satisfying the required axioms, for which we introduce linearity of strategies. As the main theorem, we establish a fully complete [30] game semantics of LLK − (without atoms) in ♯LG and a game semantics of LK − in ♯LG ? ! . Also, focusing on the intuitionistic part of the interpretations, we establish a fully complete game semantics of LLJ (without atoms) in the lluf subNSC LG wb of LG, in which strategies are well-bracketed [31] , and a game semantics of LJ in LG wb ! . Thus, we establish a semantic unity of logic, where linear refinement and intuitionistic restriction correspond respectively to deletion of the co-Kleisli construction ( ) ! and/or the Kleisli construction ( ) ? , and imposing well-bracketing on strategies.
F. Our Contribution and Related Work
Broadly, our main contribution is to establish the novel, in particular sequential and unpolarized, unity of logic in terms of sequent calculi, categories and games. Novelties are the unified (categorical and game) semantics and linearity of strategies; highlights are the full completeness results.
Our approach stands in sharp contrast to the concurrent and/or polarized approaches [21] , [22] , [23] , [32] , [33] , [34] for they stick to LL or its polarized fragments, while we modify the logic into the sequential, unpolarized LL − .
Our categorical account is based on the established categorical semantics of ILL [35] , [36] , [37] , [28] and of IL [26] , [27] , as well as the study of the relation between monad and comonad [29] and its application in game semantics [38] .
G. Structure of the Paper
We first present the sequent calculi in Sect. II, and the categorical semantics in Sect. III. Then, we establish the game semantics in Sect. IV together with some consequences in Sect. V. Finally, we show the full completeness in Sect. VI, and draw a conclusion and propose future work in Sect. VII.
II. SEQUENT CALCULI FOR THE LOGICS
We assume that the reader is familiar with the formal languages and the sequent calculi for classical logic (CL) and intuitionistic logic (IL) [8] , [3] , and those for linear logic (LL) and intuitionistic linear logic (ILL) [1] , [3] , [9] .
Throughout the paper, we focus on propositional logic [39] .
A. Sequent Calculi for Classical and Intuitionistic Logics
Let us first present our sequent calculi LK − for CL, and LJ for IL. Roughly, LK − is obtained from Gentzen's LK [8] by restricting the rule (⇒R) ∆,A⊢B,Γ ∆⊢A⇒B,Γ to ⇒R − given in Fig. 1 (so that they can be modeled by sequential game semantics).
As minor points, we define negation ¬ by ¬A df.
= A ⇒ ⊥, and include top ⊤ and the right-rule on bottom ⊥ for our unified approach. Also, we modify ∧L and ∨R into the ones closer to the calculi for (I)LL [1] , [3] for convenience, which, in the presence of the structural rules, does not matter.
Definition 1 (LK − ). The calculus LK − for CL consists of the rules in Fig. 1 . In Sect. V, we give a cut-elimination procedure [8] , [3] on LK − by normalization-by-evaluation (NBE) [25] , exploiting the fully complete game semantics given in Sect. IV.
If one identifies sequents up to currying, which is implicitly assumed by the one-sided calculus for CL [3] and justified by the game semantics, the change of ⇒R into ⇒R − is not a real restriction. In this sense, LK − is equivalent to LK.
Definition 2 (LJ [8] , [3] ). The calculus LJ for IL consists of the rules of LK that have only intuitionistic sequents, i.e., ones such that the number of formulas on the RHS is 1.
B. Sequent Calculi for Linear Logic
In the present work, let us call the sequent calculi for LL and ILL [1] , [3] LLK and LLJ, respectively. As mentioned in the introduction, LL and LLK are concurrent and polarized; thus, we introduce the following sequential, unpolarized fragment:
Notation. Given n ∈ N, we define n df.
= {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Definition 3 (LL − and LLK − ). The formal language of linear logic negative (LL − ) is obtained from that of LL by discarding linear negation ( ) ⊥ . The calculus LLK − for LL − consists of the rules in Fig. 2 
That is, LLK − is obtained from LLK by discarding linear negation ( ) ⊥ , restricting the rules and (⊸R) ∆,A⊢B,Γ ∆⊢A⊸B,Γ , respectively, to Cut − , ⊗R − ,`L − , &R − , ⊕L − and ⊸R − given in Fig. 2 , and adding the distribution rules !?L, !?R, ⊗`L and ⊗`R. It is easy to see that Cut, ⊗R and`L are derivable in LLK − in the presence of ⊗`L and ⊗`R. For example, Cut is derived in LLK − by: = (`Γ)`B. These derived Cut, ⊗R and`L faithfully represent our categorical semantics given in Sect. III.
On the other hand, the remaining two distribution rules !?L and !?R enable us to translate LK − into LLK − : Theorem 4 (Translation of LK − into LLK − ). There is a translation T c of formulas and proofs that assigns, to every
Proof. We shall translate each rule of LK − into a proof tree in LLK − . First, note that we have shown that Cut is admissible in LLK − ; then, Cut of LK − is translated into LLK − by: ⊤L and ⊤R of LK − are translated by:
Next, it is not hard to translate (∧∨L) ∆,(A∧B)∨C⊢Γ ∆,A∧(B∨C)⊢Γ and (∧∨R) ∆⊢A∧(B∨C),Γ ∆⊢(A∧B)∨C,Γ into LLK − (by ⊗`L, ⊗`R, ?L and !R); we omit the details for lack of space. Thus, translations of ∧R and ∨L are reduced to those of (∧R − ) ∆⊢B1 ∆⊢B2 ∆⊢B1∧B2 and (∨L − ) A1⊢Γ A2⊢Γ A1∨A2⊢Γ , respectively, in the obvious way. Then, a translation of ∧R − is very simple:
Similarly, ∨L − is translated by: The translation T c of Thm. 4 is, as far as we are concerned, a novel one. In contrast to the translations of CL into LL given in [1] , [4] , [32] , [23] , our translation is unpolarized.
Finally, note that the following standard result (Thm. 6) can be seen as the intuitionistic restriction of Thm. 4 (except ∨):
Definition 5 (LLJ [9] , [10] ). The formal language of ILL is obtained from that of LL by discarding ( ) ⊥ , ? and`. The calculus LLJ for ILL consists of the rules of LLK that have only intuitionistic sequents.
Theorem 6 (Translation of LJ into LLJ [1] , [4] ). There is a translation T i of formulas and proofs that assigns, to every
Remark. Note that T c translates ∨L in terms of ⊕L − by utilizing distribution rules, while T i translates ∨L in terms of ⊕L. Nevertheless, except the mismatch between the translations of ∨L, T i can be seen as the intuitionistic restriction of T c .
III. CATEGORICAL SEMANTICS
Next, we proceed to give categorical semantics [26] , [27] of the sequent calculi introduced in Sect. II in a unified manner.
We assume that the reader is familiar with the basic concepts of symmetric monoidal (closed) categories (SM(C)Cs) and monoidal adjoints [40] , [28] . To indicate what is to be modeled, we frequently employ notations from LL for categorical structures in this section. Also, we often do not specify natural isomorphisms even if they are part of a categorical structure.
Remark. Since cut-eliminations on the calculi are given in Sect. V, we postpone (equational) soundness/completeness of the semantics to Sect. V, and in this section just assign objects and morphisms to formulas and proofs, respectively.
A. Categorical Semantics of ILL and IL
Let us first recall the standard categorical semantics of LLJ (without ⊥ or ⊕), introducing a nonstandard terminology: (1, &) and is equipped with:
In other words, a BwLSMC is simply a new-Seely category (NSC) [28] without a closed structure ⊸; it is just to state Thm. 13 and Def. 16 concisely. Recall that NSCs give a (equationally sound and complete) semantics of ILL without ⊥ or ⊕ (w.r.t. the term calculus given in [36] , [37] ):
Theorem 8 (Semantics of ILL without ⊥ or ⊕ [28] ). NSCs give a semantics of LLJ without ⊥ or ⊕.
Recall that a strong advantage of NSCs is the following: Theorem 9 (CCCs via NSCs [35] , [28] ). The co-Kleisli category C ! of a NSC C over the equipped comonad ! is cartesian closed. Proof (sketch). Let C = (C, ⊗, ⊤, ⊸, !) be a NSC, and A, B ∈ C ! . First, we may give, as a terminal object and a binary product of A and B in C ! , a terminal object 1 and a diagram A
In fact, we have an isomorphism:
The linear decomposition A ⇒ B df.
= !A ⊸ B of exponential objects in C ! into the comonad ! and the closed structure ⊸ in C is the categorical counterpart of Girard's translation [1] , and it gives a unified semantics of ILL and IL, where note that CCCs give the standard categorical semantics of IL (without ⊥ or ∨) [26] , [27] . What about ⊥ and ∨?
It then seems a natural idea to add finite coproducts (0, ⊕) to the NSC C. As pointed out in [35] , however, finite coproducts in C become weak in C ! : The morphism !0
A in C is a morphism 0 → A in C ! for each A ∈ C, but it may not be unique for !0 is not necessarily initial in C; also, it seems reasonable to take, as a coproduct of A,
← !B in C, but the induced copairings in C ! do not necessarily satisfy uniqueness as they may not be copairings in C. Meanwhile, this construction clearly works for weak coproducts in C as well, which is important as the gamesemantic NSC in Sect. IV has only weak ones. To summarize:
Corollary 10 (Semantics of ILL and IL [35] , [28] ). A NSC C = (C, ⊗, ⊤, ⊸, !) with weak finite coproducts (0, ⊕) gives a semantics of LLJ. Moreover, the co-Kleisli category C ! has:
• Finite products just given by finite products (1, &) 
• Weak finite coproducts given by (0, !( ) ⊕ !( )) in C and thus, C ! gives a semantics of LJ [26] , [27] .
Note that the derivation of the categorical semantics of IL in C ! from that of ILL in C coincides with the translation T i .
B. Categorical Semantics of LL − and CL
Our main idea on modeling LLK − is then to introduce the following symmetric structure to BwLSMCs:
Definition 11 (FwLSMCs). A SMC C = (C,`, ⊥) is forwardliberalizable (FwL) if it has finite coproducts (0, ⊕) and is equipped with:
• A monad ? = (?, η, µ) on C such that the canonical adjunction between C and the Kleisli category C ? of C over ? is monoidal;
Corollary 12 (Coproducts and weak products in FwLSMCs). The Kleisli category C ? of a FwLSMC C = (C,`, ⊥, ?) with weak finite products (1, &) has:
• Finite coproducts given by finite coproducts (0, ⊕) in C; • Weak finite products given by (1, ? 
Proof. Symmetric to Cor. 10.
Naturally, it seems a reasonable idea to require the FwLstructure on NSCs to model LLK − , but it is impossible for the game-semantic NSC LG in Sect. IV: The game-semanticà nd ? are not well-defined on non-strict [15] , [18] strategies; they may generate concurrent (or nondeterministic) strategies from non-strict, sequential (or deterministic) strategies. As we shall see, the non-strictness is caused by currying of strategies, i.e., the closed and the FwL-structures of LG are incompatible.
This suggests employing the lluf subBwLSMC ♯LG of LG whose strategies are all strict. Of course, ♯LG is not closed, but currying w.r.t. the entire domain and uncurrying w.r.t. the entire codomain are possible. This observation actually motivates the rules ⇒R − and ⊸R − given in Sect. II. It also leads to:
It is equipped with the following morphisms in ♯C:
3) It is equipped with the following isomorphisms in ♯C:
gives a semantics of LLK − in ♯C.
Proof. We interpret proofs of each sequent
in ♯C by induction on the proofs, where we indicate the interpretation of logical constants and connectives of LL − by the notation for C (n.b., the domain of the morphisms is ⊤ if m = 0, and the codomain is ⊥ if n = 0). First, Id, ⊤R and ⊥L are interpreted by identities in ♯C. We may handle ⊤L and ⊥R by the unit laws of ⊤ and ⊥, and 1R and 0L by (1) and initiality of 0, respectively. Also, the distribution rules are modeled by Ω and Υ in the obvious way.
We interpret Cut − by
The interpretations of ⊗L and`R may be reduced to the induction hypotheses; ⊗R − and`L − are interpreted by f1:∆1→B1 f2:∆2→B2 f1⊗f2:∆1⊗∆2→B1⊗B2 and g1:A1→Γ1 g2:A2→Γ2 g1`g2:A1`A2→Γ1`Γ2 . The interpretations of &L and ⊕R are given by li:∆⊗Ai→Γ i∈2
and those of &R − and ⊕L − by r1:∆→B1 r2:∆→B2 r1,r2 :∆→B1&B2 and by l1:A1→Γ l2:A2→Γ
, respectively. The interpretation of ⊸L is given as follows. Given
be the natural transformation obtained by composing Ω and symmetries w.r.t. ⊗ in the obvious manner. Then, given
Note that !D, !W and !C may be handled just as in the interpretation of ILL in NSCs [36] , [37] ; ?D, ?W and ?C are just symmetric. Also, XL and XR are interpreted by symmetries w.r.t. ⊗ and`, respectively.
Finally, ?L is interpreted by
In particular, for each A ∈ C, currying in C gives: (2)) where ¬A df.
= A ⊸ ⊥ is the negation of A. This natural bijection allows ♯C to model (linear) classical laws:
• We may get: A) , which models the classical law of excluded middle (LEM) [3] ; • We may further compose:
which models double negation elimination (DNE) [3] . Recall that our aim is to give a unity of logic; thus, we shall obtain semantics of CL from that of LL − , i.e., NSCs satisfying the assumption of Lem. 13. For this point, we employ:
Definition 14 (Distributive laws [29] ). Let C be a category, and ? = (?, η, µ) and ! = (!, ǫ, δ) a monad and a comonad on = (C ! ) ? ≃ (C ? ) ! and call it the bi-Kleisli category of C over ! and ?.
As one may have already expected, we propose C ? ! as our categorical structure to interpret CL. Hence, we define: Definition 16 (BiLSMCCs). A bi-liberalizable (BiL) SMCC is a NSC C = (C, ⊗, ⊤, ⊸, !) such that it has weak finite coproducts (0, ⊕), and it is equipped with:
• A lluf subBwLSMC ♯C and a triple (`, ⊥, ?) such that ⊤ (resp. ⊥) is terminal (resp. initial) in ♯C, ♯C(A, ⊥) = C(A, ⊥) and ♯C(⊤, B) = C(⊤, B) for all A, B ∈ C, and ♯C = (♯C,`, ⊥, ?) is FwL with finite coproducts (0, ⊕); • Natural transformations Ω, Σ and Π in ♯C (Lem. 13); • Natural isomorphisms (1) and (2) as well as
Theorem 17 (Semantics of LL − ). Each BiLSMCC C gives a semantics of LLK − in ♯C.
Proof. Immediate from Lem. 13.
The natural isomorphisms (3) and (4) are not necessary for Thm. 17, but they induce some of the De Morgan laws:
natural in A ∈ C, as well as:
natural in A, B ∈ C. Note that (4) is also one of the De Morgan laws. As we shall see in Sect. V, these natural isomorphisms exist in the game-semantic and the syntactic instances. By Thm. 4 and 17, a BiLSMCC C may interpret LK − in ♯C. In addition, it is easy to see that the interpretation of LK − occurs always in the bi-Kleisli category ♯C ? ! , and therefore: Corollary 18 (Semantics of CL). Let C = (C, ⊗, ⊤, ⊸, !) together with ♯C = (♯C,`, ⊥, ?, Ω, Σ, Π, Υ) be a BiLSMCC. The bi-Kleisli category ♯C ? ! gives a semantics of LK − such that ∧, ∨ and ⇒ are interpreted by:
for all A, B ∈ C, and there are natural isomorphisms in ♯C:
and a natural transformation in ♯C:
Proof. By the proofs of Thm. 4 and 17, the interpretation of LK − in ♯C actually occurs in ♯C ? ! ; thus, it suffices to establish the natural isomorphisms and transformation. Then, we have 
IV. GAME SEMANTICS
This section gives a game-semantic BiLSMCC LG. We employ Guy McCusker's games and strategies [18] .
A. Review: Game-Semantic NSC
Notation. Given a finite sequence s = x 1 x 2 . . . x |s| , where |s| is the length of s, we write s(i) for x i (i ∈ |s|). We define Even(s) df.
⇔ |s| ≡ 2 0, where ≡ 2 is the equality on N modulo 2, and Odd(s) df.
⇔ |s| ≡ 2 1 for a finite sequence s, and S Even df.
= {s ∈ S | Even(s) } and S Odd df. = S \ S Even for a set S of finite sequences. We write ǫ for the empty sequence.
Recall that games are based on arenas and legal positions: An arena defines the basic components of a game, which in turn induces its legal positions that specify the basic rules of the game. Let us first recall these two preliminary concepts.
Definition 19 (Arenas [18] ). An arena is a triple G = (M G , λ G , ⊢ G ), where:
• M G is a set whose elements are called moves; • λ G is a function from M G to {O, P} × {Q, A}, called the labeling function, in which O, P, Q and A are arbitrarily fixed symbols, called the labels;
arbitrarily fixed element such that ⋆ ∈ M G , called the enabling relation, that satisfies:
Definition 20 (Occurrences of moves). Given a finite sequence s ∈ M * G of moves of an arena G, an occurrence (of a move) in s is a pair (s(i), i) such that i ∈ |s|. More specifically, we call the pair (s(i), i) an initial occurrence (resp. a non-initial occurrence) in s if ⋆ ⊢ G s(i) (resp. otherwise).
• t is a subsequence of s, written (s(i 1 ), s(i 2 ), . . . , s(i |t| ));
Next, let us recall 'relevant part' of previous occurrences:
Definition 23 (Views [18] ). The Player (P-) view ⌈s⌉ G of a j-sequence s ∈ J G of an arena G is the j-subsequences of s given by the following induction on |s|: ⌈ǫ⌉ G df. = ⌈s⌉ G .mn if n is an O-move such that m justifies n. The Opponent (O-) view ⌊s⌋ G of s is symmetric to ⌈s⌉ G .
We may now recall legal positions of an arena [18] , [11] :
Definition 24 (Legal positions [18] , [11] ). A legal position of an arena G is a j-sequence s ∈ J G that satisfies:
Notation. We write L G for the set of all legal positions of G.
We are now ready to recall the following central notion:
Definition 25 (Games [18] , [11] ). A game is a quintuple
is an arena, P G is a non-empty, prefix-closed subset of L G , whose elements are called (valid) positions of G, and ≃ G is an equivalence relation on P G , called the identification of (valid) positions of G, that satisfies:
The set P G is non-empty because there is always the starting position or 'moment' of a game G, and prefix-closed because each non-empty 'moment' of G must have the previous 'moment'. Identifications of positions are originally introduced in [41] and also employed in Section 3.6 of [18] . They are to identify positions up to inessential details of 'tags' for disjoint union of sets of moves for exponential ! (Def. 29). For this underlying idea, the axioms I1, I2 and I3 should make sense.
Recall that a game G is well-founded
are, e.g., wf and wo. We also write 1 and 0 for ⊤ and ⊥, and call them the one game and the zero game, respectively. Now, let us recall standard constructions on games. For brevity, we usually omit 'tags' for disjoint union of sets. For instance, we write
We first review tensor ⊗. A position of the tensor A ⊗ B of games A and B is an interleaving mixture of positions of A and B, in which only Opponent may switch the AB-parity.
Definition 26 (Tensor product of games [18] , [11] ). The tensor (product) A ⊗ B of games A and B is defined by: s ↾ B) is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of A (resp. B);
It is easy to see that in fact only Opponent may switch the AB-parity of moves during a play of A ⊗ B by alternation.
Next, let us recall the space of linear functions [1] , [24] :
Definition 27 (Linear implication between games [18] , [11] ). The linear implication A ⊸ B from a game A to another B is defined by:
Similarly to tensor A⊗B, a position of the linear implication A ⊸ B is an interleaving mixture of positions of A and B, but only Player may switch the AB-parity again by alternation.
For lack of space, we leave the details of product & on games to [18] . Roughly, the set P A&B of all positions of the product A&B of games A and B is the disjoint union P A +P B .
Next, we introduce coproduct or sum of games:
Definition 28 (Sum of games). The sum A ⊕ B of games A and B is defined by:
That is, a non-empty position of A ⊕ B is of the form (â,b)t such thatât ∈ P A ∨bt ∈ P B . It is easy to see that an initial move of the form (â,b) ∈ M Init A × M Init B may occur in a position s only as the first element of s. Our sum of games is different from the one given in [18] to give a unity of logic. Now, let us recall the game semantics of of course !:
Definition 29 (Exponential of games [18] ). The exponential (or of course) !A of a game A is defined by:
where s ↾ i is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves (a, i) yet changed into a; Proof. Similarly to the corresponding proof in [18] .
Next, let us recall another central notion of strategies:
Definition 31 (Strategies [18] ). A strategy on a game G is a non-empty subset σ ⊆ P Even G , written σ : G, that satisfies:
• (S1) Even-prefix-closed (i.e., ∀smn ∈ σ. s ∈ σ);
As positions of a game G are to be identified up to ≃ G , we must identify strategies on G up to ≃ G , leading to: Definition 32 (Identification of strategies [18] ). The identification of strategies on a game G, written ≃ G , is the relation on strategies σ, τ : G given by σ ≃ G τ df.
The identification ≃ G of strategies on each game G forms a partial equivalence relation (PER); see [18] , [41] .
Next, we need to focus on strategies that behave as proofs, which we call winning ones:
Definition 33 (Winning of strategies). A strategy σ : G is:
, [18] , [11] ; = {⌈s⌉ G | s ∈ σ } of all P-views of σ is finite.
A conceptual explanation of winning is as follows. First, a proof or an 'argument' for the truth of a formula should not get 'stuck', and thus, strategies for proofs must be total. In addition, since logic is concerned with the truth of formulas, which are invariant w.r.t. 'passage of time', proofs should not depended on states; thus, it makes sense to impose innocence on strategies for proofs [31] , [11] . Next, recall that totality is not preserved under composition of strategies [43] , but it can be solved by additing noetherianity [42] . It conceptually makes sense too because if a play by an innocent, noetherian strategy keeps growing infinitely, then it cannot be Player's 'intention', and therefore, it should result in win for Player.
In addition, let us introduce the game-semantic counterpart of linearity of proofs in logic [1] :
Definition 34 (Linearity of strategies). A j-sequence s is linear, written L(s), if, for each even-length prefix t of s, an initial move q in t justifies exactly one question q ′ in t, and the number of answers justified by q ′ equals that of answers justified by q in t. A strategy σ : G is linear if ∀s ∈ σ. L(s).
Also, we slightly generalize strictness of strategies in [23] :
Next, let us proceed to recall standard constructions on strategies. The simplest strategies are the following:
Definition 36 (Copy-cats [17] , [41] , [31] , [18] ). The copy-cat (strategy) cp A on a game A is defined by:
on A are to distinguish the two copies of A, and t ↾ i df.
= t ↾ A [i] (i = 0, 1).
Lemma 37 (Well-defined copy-cats [17] , [18] ). Given a game A, cp A is a valid, innocent, total, linear, strict strategy on the game A ⊸ A. In addition, it is noetherian if A is wf.
Proof. We just show that cp A is noetherian if A is wf for the other points are trivial, e.g., validity of cp A is immediate from the definition of ≃ A⊸A . Given smm ∈ cp A , it is easy to see by induction on |s| that the P-view ⌈sm⌉ A⊸A is of the form m 1 m 1 m 2 m 2 . . . m k m k m, and thus, there is a sequence ⋆ ⊢ A m 1 ⊢ A m 2 · · · ⊢ A m k ⊢ A m. Therefore, if A is wf, then cp A must be noetherian.
Next, let us recall composition and tensor of strategies:
Definition 38 (Composition of strategies [18] ). Given games A, B and C, and strategies φ : A ⊸ B and ψ : B ⊸ C, the parallel composition φ ψ of φ and ψ is given by:
where the subscripts ( ) [i] on B (i = 0, 1) are to distinguish the two copies of B, s ↾ A, B [0] (resp. s ↾ B [1] , C, s ↾ B [0] , B [1] ) is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of A or B [0] (resp. B [1] or C, B [0] or B [1] ), and pr B df.
That is, the composition φ; ψ : A ⊸ C plays implicitly on
, and ψ otherwise, while Opponent plays on A ⊸ C, where φ and ψ communicate with each other via moves of B [0] or B [1] , but it is 'hidden' from Opponent.
Lemma 39 (Well-defined composition of strategies [18] , [42] ). Given games A, B and C, and strategies φ : A ⊸ B and ψ : B ⊸ C, φ; ψ is a strategy on the game A ⊸ C. If φ and ψ are winning (resp. linear, strict), then so is φ; ψ. Given strategies φ ′ : A ⊸ B and ψ ′ :
Proof. It is well-known that innocent strategies are closed under composition [11] , [18] . Also, it is shown in [42] that the conjunction of innocence, totality and noetherianity is preserved under composition. Finally, composition clearly preserves linearity, strictness and identification of strategies.
Definition 40 (Tensor product of strategies [17] , [18] ). Given games A, B, C and D, and strategies φ : A ⊸ C and ψ : B ⊸ D, the tensor (product) φ ⊗ ψ of φ and ψ is given by:
is the j-subsequence of s that consists of moves of A or C (resp. B or D).
Intuitively the tensor φ ⊗ ψ : A ⊗ B ⊸ C ⊗ D plays by φ if the last O-move is of A or C, and by ψ otherwise.
Let us leave the details of pairing , , copairing [ , ], promotion ( ) † and derelictions der to [18] for lack of space. Lemma 41 (Well-defined constructions on strategies [18] ). Given games A, B, C and D, and strategies φ : A ⊸ C and ψ : B ⊸ D, φ ⊗ ψ is a strategy on A ⊗ B ⊸ C ⊗ D. If φ and ψ are winning (resp. linear, strict), then so is φ⊗ψ. Given strategies φ ′ : A ⊸ C and ψ ′ : B ⊸ D such that φ ≃ A⊸C φ ′ and ψ ≃ B⊸D ψ ′ , we have φ⊗ψ ≃ A⊗B⊸C⊗D φ ′ ⊗ψ ′ . Similar statements hold for pairing and promotion. The dereliction der A is a valid, innocent, total, linear, strict strategy on
Definition 42 (Category LG). The category LG is given by:
• Objects are wf-games;
• Identities are given by id A df.
Theorem 43 (NSC LG). The tuple LG = (LG, ⊗, ⊤, ⊸, !) forms a NSC with finite products (1, &) .
Proof. As outlined in [12] and by Lem. 30, 37 and 41 (constructions on strategies are lifted to their equivalence classes, and games are wf for copy-cats to be noetherian).
For lack of space, we leave the details of well-bracketing (wb) of strategies to [31] , [18] . It is easy to show:
Corollary 44 (NSC LG wb ). The lluf subcategory LG wb of LG, in which for each morphism [φ] the strategy φ is wb, forms a subNSC of LG with finite products (1, &) .
B. Game-Semantic BiLSMCC
Now, let us define a FwL-structure (`, ⊥, ?) on:
Definition 45 (Subcategory ♯LG). The lluf subcategory ♯LG of LG has exactly morphisms [φ] in LG such that φ is strict.
Clearly, ♯LG is not closed, but Thm. 43 immediately gives:
Lemma 46 (BwLSMC ♯LG). The category ♯LG together with the triple (⊗, ⊤, !) inherited from LG is a BwLSMC with finite coproducts (0, ⊕) (n.b., they are weak in LG as in [18] ).
Definition 47 (Par on games). The par of games A and B is the game A`B defined by:
and a ∈ M A (resp. b ∈ M B ) with the former changed intoâ (resp.b);
Dually to tensor ⊗, a position of A`B is an interleaving mixture of positions of A and B in which only Player may switch the AB-parity again by alternation. Also, similarly to sum ⊕, only the first element of each position of A`B can be of the form (â,b) ∈ M Init A × M Init B . Note also that our par on games slightly generalizes that on wo-games given in [23] .
For instance, typical plays of A`B are as follows: Definition 48 (Par on strategies). Given games A, B, C and D, the par of strategies φ : φ`ψ may not satisfy the axiom S2 (Def. 31) unless φ and ψ are both strict. If φ and ψ are strict, φ`ψ plays, e.g., as:
Hence,`cannot be a bifunctor on LG, but it can be on ♯LG: Lemma 50 (Well-defined par). The functor par`is indeed a well-defined bifunctor on ♯LG.
Proof. First,`on objects is clearly well-defined. Next,ò n strict strategies is well-defined, and it clearly preserves linearity, totality, noetherianity and identification of strategies.
For preservation of innocence, let φ : A ⊸ B and ψ : B ⊸ D be innocent. Note that, during a play of the game A`B ⊸ C`D, each O-move occurring in the codomain C`D cannot change the CD-parity, while the domain A`B part of each P-view must be that of A or B. Hence, the P-view of each element s ∈ φ`ψ is either the P-view of s ↾ A, C ∈ φ or s ↾ B, D ∈ ψ, whence φ`ψ is innocent.
Finally,`clearly preserves composition and identities.
Definition 51 (Why not on games). The why not of a game A is the game ?A defined by:
and (a, i) ∈ M A × N yet changed into α(i) and a, respectively;
where the function att ?A :
Definition 52 (Why not on strategies). The why not of a strategy φ : A ⊸ B is the subset ?φ ⊆ P Even ?A⊸?B given by:
= {s ∈ P Even ?A⊸?B | ∀i ∈ N. s ↾ i ∈ φ } where s ↾ i is the obvious analogue of that given in Def. 51.
Why not is essentially the infinite iteration of par, i.e., ?A ∼ = A`A`A . . . and ?φ ∼ = φ`φ`φ . . . A similar construction was introduced independently in [38] for a different purpose. As outlined in the paper, we may lift ? to a monad on ♯LG:
Definition 53 (Why not monad). Given A ∈ ♯LG, strategies wst A : A ⊸ ?A and abs A : ??A ⊸ ?A, called the waste and the absorption on A, respectively, are defined by: Proof. Similarly to the corresponding proof in [38] . Now, based on Lem. 46, 50 and 54, it is easy to establish:
Theorem 55 (BiLSMCC LG). The NSC LG together with the lluf subBwLSMC ♯LG, the triple (`, ⊥, ?), the obvious natural transformations Ω, Σ and Π, natural isomorphisms (1)- (4) , and the distributive law Υ : !? ⇒ ?! given by: occurrence (a, j) with a, is a BiLSMCC.
V. CUT-ELIMINATION, SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS Next, let us define cut-elimination processes on the calculi given in Sect. II by the game semantics given in Sect. IV.
To define the cut-elimination processes, the following inductive, categorical notion plays a key role:
Definition 56 (LL − morphisms). Given a BiLSMCC C, a morphism in ♯C is LL − if it is of the following form:
such that φ, ς and ̺ are morphisms in ♯C inductively constructed respectively by the following grammars:
where ! ⊤ (resp. ! ⊥ ) is the canonical one to ⊤ (resp. from ⊥), α, ℓ and ̟ respectively range over associativities, units and symmetries w.r.t. ⊗ or`, θ (resp. ϑ) over natural isomorphisms of ! (resp. ?), π i and ι i over projections and injections (i = 1, 2), respectively, ! = (!, ǫ, δ), ? = (?, η, µ), and λ (resp. λ −1 ) is currying w.r.t. the entire domain (resp. uncurrying w.r.t. the entire codomain).
Lemma 57 (Inductive semantics of LL − ). The interpretation of any proof in LLK − in any BiLSMCC is LL − . Proof. By induction on proofs in LLK − .
Lemma 58 (Inductive definability). Given a BiLSMCC C, let ∆ and Γ be sequences of formulas of LL − , and f : ∆ → Γ a LL − -morphism in ♯C, where ∆ , Γ ∈ C are the interpretations of the sequences. Then, there is a proof p of a sequent ∆ ⊢ Γ in LLK − whose interpretation p equals f .
Proof. Since f is LL − , we may write f = ̺•φ•ς; see (7) . By the structural and the distribution rules in LLK − and naturality of ς and ̺, ς and ̺ may be excluded; thus, it suffices to prove definability of φ. Then, it is immediate by induction on φ.
By Lem. 57 and 58, we may first compute the interpretation p of any given proof p in LLK − in ♯LG (as defined in the proof of Thm. 17) and then calculate the proof nf(p) in LLK − , called the normal-form of p, from p such that nf(p) = p (as defined in the proof of Lem. 58). Note that there is no Cut − occurring in nf(p), i.e., nf(p) is cut-free; that is, we have defined a cut-elimination process nf on LLK − . Combined with Thm. 4, it is not hard to give such a process on LK − , and by the same method, on LLJ (without ⊕) and LJ (without ∨) as well, which for lack of space we omit. To summarize:
Theorem 59 (Correctness). Given a proof p of a sequent ∆ ⊢ Γ in LLK − (resp. LK − , LLJ, LJ), the normal-form nf(p) of p is cut-free, and nf(p) = p , where is the interpretation of the calculus in ♯LG (resp. ♯LG ? ! , LG wb , LG wb ! ). Theorem 60 (Categorical soundness/completeness). Given a BiLSMCC C, the interpretation of LLK − (resp. LK − , LLJ, LJ) in ♯C (resp. ♯C ? ! , C, C ! ) is equationally sound and complete w.r.t. the cut-elimination defined above.
Proof. The soundness is by induction on proofs, and the completeness immediately follows from Thm. 55.
VI. FULL COMPLETENESS
Lem. 58 characterizes definable strategies only inductively, which is not satisfactory as full completeness per se (n.b., it was to define the cut-elimination procedure). This last main section addresses the problem: Focusing on finite, strongly linear strategies, it gives a non-inductive full completeness:
Definition 61 (Strong linearity of strategies). A strategy φ : A ⊸ B is strongly linear if it is linear, strict, and satisfies: 1) If B = (X 1 ⊗ X 2 )`Y for some games X 1 , X 2 and Y ,
2) If A = X 1 ⊗ (X 2`Y ) for some games X 1 , X 2 and Y , Theorem 62 (Full completeness). Let ∆ → Γ be the interpretation of a sequent ∆ ⊢ Γ without atoms in LLK − (resp. LLJ without ⊕) in ♯LG (resp. LG wb ), and [φ] : ∆ → Γ in the category such that φ is finite and strongly linear. Then, there is a proof p of ∆ ⊢ Γ in the calculus such that p = [φ].
Proof. By finiteness and strong linearity of φ, we may show full completeness of the interpretation of LLK − in ♯LG by induction on ∆, Γ. Finally, full completeness of the interpretation of LLJ (without ⊕) in LG wb is shown just similarly.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have given a unity of logic in terms of sequent calculi, categories and games. As future work, we would like to develop term calculi that match our semantics. We are also interested in extending the present work to predicate logic.
